理论与方法专栏 | 牛津普遍语法手册
编者按
《理论语言学五道口站》（2020年第49期，总第113期）理论与方法专栏为大家推荐剑桥大学语言学教授Ian Roberts 2017年在Oxford University Press出版的著作The Oxford Handbook of Universal Grammar（《牛津普遍语法手册》）。
著作简介
The Oxford Handbook of Universal Grammar
《牛津普遍语法手册》
摘要：
人们早就了解到：世界上的各种语言不是“孤立存在”，而是“普遍联系”的。这种“联系”主要在于各语言的“表达措辞”相近，特别是不同语言之间的“语法结构”显示出越来越多的相似性。有关该说法的讨论，最早起源于古希腊著名哲学家柏拉图和亚里士多德。除此之外，在中世纪的“经院哲学”、17世纪的“皇家-港口语法学家”间和现代“语言学理论”中也皆有涉及。在现代语言学理论中，最具有影响力的学者当属美国著名理论语言学家—诺姆·乔姆斯基。他提出了一套适用于各种语言的“语法结构规则”，即“普遍语法”。“普遍语法”揭示了世界上各种语言表面虽具有多样性，但内在深层结构却一致。本书的主要目的就是为读者提供有关“乔姆斯基观点”的概述。希望读者读过此书之后，通过结合当时具体的研究背景，对乔姆斯基理论的形成和发展有所了解的同时，对其重要的观点和理论也有较为明晰的认识和理解。本书共分为五个章节，其各章节分别为：普遍语法的哲学问题、普遍语法的语言学问题、语言习得、对比句法和普遍语法的相关问题探究。
Abstract:
The idea that all languages show affinities in their organisation, and particularly in grammar, is not a new one. It arguably originates in the thought of Plato and Aristotle, and manifests in medieval scholastic philosophy, in the 17th-century Port-Royal grammarians, and in modern linguistic theory. In modern linguistics, the concept of a universal set of structural principles that underlies the superficial grammatical diversity of the world’s languages has been most influentially developed by Noam Chomsky. The primary goal of this Handbook is to provide an overview and guide to this aspect of Chomsky’s thinking, to set Chomsky’s ideas in context, to look at their motivation, and to consider their implications. The Handbook is divided into five parts. Part I deals with the philosophical questions related to Universal Grammar (UG), Part II deals with general questions of linguistic theory, Part Ⅲ with language acquisition, Part IV with comparative syntax and Part V with wider issues.
大自然的语言丰富多彩：鸟儿啾啾唱，猫儿喵喵叫，小狗汪汪吠，小马咴咴鸣。大多数动物，至少绝大部分哺乳动物，都有其“特别”的发音方式。人类也不例外，其通过“语言”进行交流，更准确地说是“语言能力”。
人类的“语言能力”区别于鸟啼、狗吠。（参考Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002）原因在于性质不同：即较其他动物而言，人类的“语言形式”是无限的。Berwick 和Chomsky (2016:1) 介绍了人类语言的基本属性，其定义道：“语言是产生‘无限’表达式的‘有限’计算系统，每一种表达式在‘语义-语用系统’和‘感知运动系统’（即思想-发声系统）中都有一个明确的解读”。除人类以外，其他动物并不存在这一特性。（参考Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002）或许也正因为人类语言的这种属性，导致人类无所不在，影响深远。
为何人类能够无限“储存知识”和“处理信息”？为何人类能拥有“复杂思维”且能“支配其他生物”？又为何人类能够有能力“自我毁灭”且能“离开地球”？上述行为，除了人类，其他生物都无法企及。这是一种偶然吗？其实不然。正是因为语言能力赋予了人类卓越的“认知能力”，再加上人类“科学技术文明”的发展（尽管科技的进步对人类和其他动物的影响有好有坏）一起造就了今天的局面。简单来说，没有语言，就失去了一切发展的基础。不会有宇宙飞船和核武器、不会有甜甜圈和艺术、更不会有ipad或ipod。广义上来说，这本书讲述了我们脑内真实存在的一种东西。或者正是因此，才有了如今的世界，也正因此，使人类与动物、人类与自然有了千丝万缕的联系。
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读到后面的读者应该会注意到，有关“普遍语法”的讨论极其丰富，全书围绕“普遍语法”这一主题，支持、质疑、并修正了一些理论观点。序言中的评述较为粗略，接下来各章节的评述逐步由某一领域慢慢深入。可以毫不夸张的说，仅仅是了解“普遍语法”下丰富的“语言形式”，就可以让一个人花上一辈子的时间去学习。
这也许就是“普遍语法”的魅力所在。人们对“普遍语法”的探索从未停止，每一次对“普遍语法”的认真挖掘和尝试，都让人们更接近“世界的真相”。人们开始懂得为什么自己和其他动物“与众不同”：从清晰的表达，到信息的传递；从言语的沟通再到记忆的储存。我们自发地创造语言、理解语言，有条不紊、从容不乱地与这个世界沟通着。近年来，对于“普遍语法”的研究如火如荼的展开，当然，其中难免会有些质疑的声音。（如Evans and Levinson 2009; Tomasello 2009)。但我还是坚信，经典的理论永远不怕质疑和挑战。虽然也不排除某些批评的声音可能是正确的，但是说“普遍语法”理论消亡还为时过早。至少现阶段，“普遍语法“对于当前语言学研究仍具有重要参考价值。人们心里也许会存疑，既然质疑的声音如此大，该理论是否真的有问题。不过不要紧，阅读书中各章节之后，该疑问就会迎刃而解。
Birds sing, cats meow, dogs bark, horses neigh, and we talk. Most animals, or at least most higher mammals, have their own ways of making noises for their own purposes. This book is about the human noise-making capacity, or, to put it more accurately (since there’s much more to it than just noise), our faculty of language.
There are very good reasons to think that our language faculty is very different in kind and in consequences from birds’ song faculty, dogs’ barking faculty, etc. (see Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002, chapter 21 and the references given there). Above all, it is different in kind because it is unbounded in nature. Berwick and Chomsky (2016:1) introduce what they refer to as the Basic Property of human language in the following terms: ‘a language is a finite computational system yielding an infinity of expressions, each of which has a definite interpretation in semantic-pragmatic and sensorimotor systems (informally, thought and sound).’ Nothing of this sort seems to exist elsewhere in the animal kingdom (see again Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002). Its consequences are ubiquitous and momentous:Can it be an accident that the only creature with an unbounded vehicle of this kind for the storage, manipulation, and communication of complex thoughts is the only creature to dominate all others, the only creature with the capacity to annihilate itself, and the only creature capable of devising a means of leaving the planet? The link between the enhanced cognitive capacity brought about by our faculty for language and our advanced technological civilization, with all its consequences good and bad for us and the rest of the biosphere, is surely quite direct. Put simply, no language, then no spaceships, no nuclear weapons, no doughnuts, no art, no iPads, or iPods. In its broadest conception, then, this book is about the thing in our heads that brought all this about and got us—and the creatures we share the planet with, as well as perhaps the planet itself—where we are today.
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One thing which should be apparent to the reader who has got this far is that the area of study that surrounds, supports, questions or elaborates the notion (or notions) of universal grammar is extremely rich. My remarks in this introductory chapter have been extremely sketchy for the most part. The chapters to follow treat their topics in more depth, but each is just an overview of a particular area. It is no exaggeration to say that one could spend a lifetime just reading about UG in its various guises.
And this is how it should be. The various ideas of UG and universal grammar entertained here represent serious attempts to understand arguably the most extraordinary feature of our species: our ability to produce and understand language (in a stimulus-free yet appropriate manner) in order to articulate, develop, communicate and store complex thoughts. Like any bold and interesting idea, UG has its critics. In recent years, some have been extremely vocal (see in particular Evans and Levinson 2009; Tomasello 2009). Again this is as it should be: all good ideas can and should be challenged. Even if these critics turn out to be correct (although I think it is fair to say that reports of the ‘death of UG’ are somewhat premature), at the very minimum the idea has served as an outstandingly useful heuristic for finding out more about language. But one is naturally led to wonder whether the idea can really be wholly wrong if it is able to yield so much, aside from any intrinsic explanatory value it may have. Both that fecundity and the explanatory force of the idea are amply attested in the chapters to follow.
-Ian Roberts-
lan Roberts，剑桥大学语言学教授、剑桥大学唐宁学院教授。曾在日内瓦大学、班戈为学和斯图加特大学任教。lan Roberts教授是著名生成语言学家，也是乔姆斯基最简方案的推崇者。他的主要研究领域是比较语言学。
lan Roberts, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Cambridge and Downing College, Cambridge. He taught at the University of Geneva, University of Bangor and University of Stuttgart. He is a famous generative linguist and enthusiastic adopter of Chomsky's Minimalist Program. He mainly focuses on theoretical linguistics, more specifically on comparative syntax.
Andrea Moro & David Poeppel | 大脑中的语言
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